讲座主题：Do Partial Ownership Interests Hinder Collusion?
嘉宾简介：秦承忠，加州大学圣芭芭拉分校经济学教授，美国爱荷华大学经济学博士，主要研究领域为产业经济学、博弈论和信息经济学等。在Journal of Economic Theory和Games and Economic Behavior等国际顶尖经济学期刊上发表论文20余篇，担任Economic Theory、Economic Theory Bulletin和Frontiers of Economics in China的编委。
内容摘要：Partial ownership interests, whereby a firm acquires a share of a competitor's profits, have been growing prevalence across various industries. This paper demonstrates that instead of fostering collusion in repeated oligopolidtic competition with differentiated products, such partial ownership interests actually impede collusion. This effect holds true as long as the acquiring firms themselves are not subject to partial acquisition. The anti-collusive outcome underscores the importance of product differentiation as a critical determinant influencing the competive impact of partial ownership interests. Moreover, it provides a compelling rationale for why partial ownership interests do not raise antitrust concerns.